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given the distribution of party weights following the election and the lack of any obvious alternative options. Given this context, however, the length and difficulty of the subsequent coalition negotiations between the CDU/CSU and FDP took many by surprise and indicated that this was not a simple return to the tried-and-tested 'BlackYellow model' of the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. This article argues that the reasons for this lie in the changed dynamics of the German party system over the last thirty years.
In doing so, the article also provides a re-examination of the context within which the formation of the Black Yellow coalition took place that throws light upon the logic of coalition formation more broadly in Germany.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. in the light of the changes that have taken place. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of the data and main arguments.
SACRIFICING PARSIMONY FOR EXPLANATION: ANALYSING COALITION FORMATION IN

GERMANY
As noted above, this article deploys a thick synthetic framework to explain the process of coalition formation in Germany in 2009. The framework is still reasonably abstracted and there is no reason why it could not be deployed in any 'strong' party system in which levels of party system fragmentation make coalition government necessary. However, it does not possess the elegance and parsimony of a 'classic' coalition model, is more explanatory than predictive and anyway is not, in the strictest sense, a model at all.
The framework is premised on the assumption that the players of real-world coalition games are party elites but that their strategic calculus is subject to a bounded rationality imposed upon them by three factors. First, the players have imperfect information and the costs of processing that information is often high and sometimes beyond their capabilities. Second, there are significant institutional constraints imposed upon the players, not just in terms of the wider 'rules of the game' associated with -in this instance -German party politics, but also in terms of the beliefs, norms, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) associated with the political parties that they lead and the subsequent transaction costs associated with their influence on the game. Third, the players' calculi are skewed by 'pure time preference', in which premiums are placed on payoffs accruing nearer in time and those that are more remote in time are discounted. Let us look at each of these in turn.
The first point, about imperfect information and the costs associated with information processing, is an empirical objection to the common use of 'core theory' 4 and the calculation of dimension-by-dimension medians 5 or DDMs, in analysing players' strategies during the process of coalition formation. Core-theoretical models are deployed to analyse the relative policy positions of political parties at T1 -immediately before or after the election 6 -and seek to identify the 'political heart' 7 of players' preference curves in n dimensional policy space. DDM approaches will often focus on the period between T2 (the start of coalition negotiations) and the T3 (the signing of the formal coalition agreement or government declaration) and compare the 'latticing' 8 of players' initial preference curves as well as the positioning of the eventual government declaration in policy space. This retroductive process is a very powerful tool for, for instance, determining which party was most effective in making sure that its policy preferences were included in the eventual government declaration but is less convincing in inferring the relative power of parties at T1. This is because, as touched upon above, it is at least questionable to assume that players are cognitively capable 9 of making the sort of multi-dimensional calculus envisaged by these models; certainly not in the absence of the kind of analytical tools, such as 'wordscore' or' wordfish', that are deployed so effectively by political scientists to map such space 10 . Moreover, even if they did have this capacity it is hard to credit that they would be willing to incur the kind of deliberation costs that such multi-dimensional calculations would incur within complex party hierarchies 11 .
This leads us to the second point, the constraining impact of the institutional context in which coalition players operate. As already noted, some of these relate to the rules of the game of German party politics and do not really need any substantive reiteration here 12 . Just as important are the beliefs, norms, and SOPs of the political parties that the players lead. Beliefs and norms are obvious constraints: for instance, the SPD's scope for co-operation with the Greens in the 1980s and 1990s was restricted by widespread opposition within the party to a strategy of co-operation 13 16 and often hold many of these beliefs themselves. However, the 'curvilinear disparity' between elite beliefs and those of mid-level cadre in particular is well documented 17 and implies that some of these constraints are to all intents and purposes exogenous to the coalition game and as a result imposed upon players by an often recalcitrant party with the potential to sanction leaders when their strategic choices as players move away from the settled preferences (or indeed prejudices) of the parties they lead 18 .
The impact of the constraints imposed by beliefs and norms is most obvious in the pre-election statements, described in the introduction to this article, that German party elites often issue prior to elections ruling out particular coalition arrangements 19 .More subtle and, from the perspective of this article, important are the impact of SOPs as a constraint upon the kind of multi-dimensional calculus discussed earlier. For even if, as already discussed, players were able to make complex multi-dimensional calculations at T1 the process by which one or more parties are able to reach their goal(s) at T3 changes the rules of the game profoundly. (Indeed, it would not be too strong to wonder whether the process after T1 is not a different game entirely). Here I draw upon a number of well-established studies of complex organisations that analyse how strategies are implemented from the initial decision phase to that of implementation 20 . The literature reveals that the process of formal negotiations involves trust-building through (a) delegating and monitoring on the part of the leadership and (b) formalising and scoping on the part of the party professionals tasked with bringing about the merger in practical terms 21 . Both of these processes involve a degree of risk-taking; for instance in coalition negotiations it may mean giving ground on an important policy objective or even giving way completely in the allocation of a key policy portfolio. It is here, when parties become, as it were, 'preferred bidders', that the kind of DDM analysis discussed above can come into its own, especially as the formalising and scoping process reduces the information and transaction costs involved and makes the kind of multi-dimensional calculations envisaged in these approaches a little less costly and therefore more likely. But, as will be made clear later in this section, at T1 the strategic calculus is by necessity a far simpler matter, which is why, although strongly explanatory in many ways, DDM models are not effective in predicting real-world coalition outcomes 22 .
This leads us to the third point; that players in the coalition game are subject to pure time preference. Again, as already noted, the concept of pure time preference refers to the process by which players will place a premium on payoffs accruing nearer in time and discount those that are more remote in time. The exact size of a discount rate is somewhat arbitrary, although cost benefit analyses for large capital-intensive or long-term investment projects will refer to various formal benchmarks in order to set such a rate 23 . In the economics literature there is a significant strand of thought that questions the ethics of such rates 24 but what is important for the purposes of this article is that any kind of time discounting has a profound impact on the kind of costbenefit analysis that coalition players must make at T1. All things being equal, pure time preference has three effects.
The first effect of pure time preference is that it shifts the balance between office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs with office-seeking payoffs having more immediate utility and being weighted by players accordingly. At the same time, however, coalition players do not work to a common benchmark and there will be variance in the degree of this shift between political parties; depending on the kind of normative constraints discussed earlier. This is consistent with empirical work 25 that operationalises formal modelling put forward by Sened 26 and demonstrates that not only do German political parties display a mix of office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs but that the exact mix of these two kinds of payoff varies from party to party.
The second effect is that, whilst policy-seeking as a whole is discounted to some degree, it also follows that the constellation of policy choices is impacted as well.
As a result, policy choices that involve relatively long-term utility flows or those that incur immediate costs will be discounted against those that yield more immediate payoffs (the so-called 'low hanging fruit' such as tax cuts or rises and other forms of high profile or media-friendly measures). This point is not developed in this article but the Black-Yellow coalition's direction of travel in policy terms is discussed elsewhere in this volume.
The third effect is more relevant to this article: that all things being equal it follows that players will prefer to enter into coalition arrangements of which the parties they represent have had previous experience rather than choose potential coalitions that have not been road-tested, as it where, at least at the state level and preferably at the federal level. As discussed earlier, the process of coalition negotiations from T1 through T2 to T3 is costly, both in terms of informationprocessing and also in terms of the organisational resources that are required.
So, in the light of the arguments made above, this article deploys a synthetic framework, based on the following four assumptions:  Fourth, all strategic decisions are subject to 'pure time preference' and players will prefer to enter into familiar coalition arrangements rather than choose unfamiliar potential coalitions.
As will become apparent in our analysis of the 2009 coalition game, the first three assumptions are easy to read-off against the distribution of party weights and realworld coalition outcome, whilst assumption four requires some contextual analysis and is a jumping off point for further research in the future. Nevertheless, having The impact of these new entrants on the dynamics of the German party system was profound but was also to produce mixed fortunes for the established parties.
Moreover, the full effects of these changes were not all immediately apparent in the 1980s and 1990s and have had more profound effects in recent federal elections.
Initially, the fact that both parties at least started off as flanking parties on the left-right dimension presented the SPD with a thorny strategic dilemma. Even before the arrival of the Greens, the SPD had been forced to develop a programmatic profile that was sufficiently centrist to appeal to the median voter whilst still possessing enough redistributive elements to maintain the support of its core blue-collar However, I would argue that in historical terms, this is just the working through of the longer term effects unleashed by the changes that took place between 1983 and 1990.
In effect the sudden increase in party system fragmentation that became visible from 'positive feedback' effects 41 . Over the two decades from the early 1980s onwards, this positive feedback resonated between the 'demand side' of party politics, as it where, in which partisan dealignment and voters' slow disenchantment with the established parties opened up enough viable political space for the Greens in particular 42 and later the PDS 43 to emerge, and the 'supply side', in which the persistence and consolidation of these new political competitors opened up new domains of political contestation, thus further eroding voters' confidence in and support for the established parties. Over this period, these feedback effects transformed the German party system from the cosy triangular dynamic of the 'Pappi model' 44 , through what was sometimes thought of as a 'two-bloc' system 45 , towards what Niedermayer has described as a 'fluid party system' 46 that more accurately reflects the complex society that Germany has become 47 . As will be discussed below, in such a configuration there was no longer a kingmaker; just two large, albeit diminished, Volksparteien and three smaller parties occupying niche positions within the political space defined by the dominant left-right and secondary libertarian-authoritarian axes 48 . It was under these conditions that the 2009 coalition game was played.
THE 2009 COALITION GAME
Given that we have established that the increased fluidity of the German party system was unleashed by the process of change that was heralded by the emergence of the So, how did these developments play out in real-world politics? And how well do the four assumptions set out earlier in this article perform in focusing our analyses? Table Two sets winner. On the other hand, all eight outcomes conform to the relaxed bargaining proposition, indicating that whilst 'pure' office-seeking alone cannot explain coalition outcomes in Germany, the desire to avoid the co-ordination costs associated with a multi-party coalition is a powerful factor in real-world coalition choices.
We now move on to assumption two, that any numerical formation criteria are modified through the recognition of ideological adjacency and that players will aim to join the MCW with the smallest ideological range. Table Two demonstrates Our fourth assumption, that all strategic decisions are subject to the players' pure time preference, can only be more explored through a more contextual approach.
It will be recalled that I argue that the impact of pure time preference on the coalition game is threefold: (1) that it will shift the balance between office seeking and policyoriented payoffs and that the degree of this shift varies between parties; (2) that policy choices that involve long-term utility flows or incur immediate costs will be discounted against those that yield more immediate payoffs; and (3) that players will prefer to enter into familiar coalition arrangements rather than choose unfamiliar potential coalitions.
The balance between office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs and the policy choices that underpinned the winning coalition are dealt with elsewhere in this volume. The third effect is more relevant to this article: that all things being equal it follows that players will prefer to enter into coalition arrangements of which the parties they represent have had previous experience rather than choose potential coalitions that have not been road-tested, as it where, at least at the state level and preferably at the federal level. As discussed when this framework was put forward, the process of coalition negotiations from T1 through T2 to T3 is costly, both in terms of information-processing and also in terms of the organisational resources that are required. As Table Two Wahlen, 1983 Wahlen, , 1987 Wahlen, , 1990 Wahlen, , 1994 Wahlen, , 1998 Wahlen, , 2002 Wahlen, , 2005 Wahlen, , 2009 
